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Abstract 
The problem of how to make the transition to a more environmentally and socially 
sustainable society poses questions about how such far-reaching social change can be brought 
about. In recent years, lifecourse transitions have been identified by a range of researchers as 
opportunities for policy and other actors to intervene to change how individuals use energy, 
taking advantage of such disruptive transitions to encourage individuals to be reflexive 
towards their lifestyles and how they use the technological infrastructures on which they rely. 
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Such identifications, however, employ narratives of voluntary change that take an overly 
optimistic view of how individuals experience lifecourse transitions, and ignore effects of 
experiences of unresolved or unsuccessful transitions. Drawing on interview data from the 
Energy Biographies project at Cardiff University, we explore three case studies where the 
effects of such unresolved transitions are significant. Using the concept of liminal transition 
as developed by Victor Turner, we examine instances where ‘progressive’ narratives of 
energy use reduction clash with other ‘narrative genres’ used to make sense of change. Such 
clashes show how narratives that view lifecourse transitions as opportunities ignore the 
challenges that such transitions may pose to efforts to construct or sustain identities. 
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Introduction 
In response to the problem of how to make the transition to a more environmentally and 
socially sustainable society, a growing body of work has identified lifecourse transitions as 
‘moments’ in which practices may undergo transformation (Hards, 2011, 2012; Maller & 
Strengers, 2013). It has been proposed that the impact of such interventions may be more 
significant at such times because they are taking place amidst a general disruption of habits 
and practices (Schäfer, Jaeger-Erben, & Bamberg, 2012).  
 However, questions remain about whether lifecourse transitions should be treated 
homogeneously as opportunities, and about whether some kinds of transition may actually 
constitute obstacles to change. Such questions may be approached from different angles. One 
could undertake, for example, a factors-based analysis of conditions that may facilitate or 
obstruct further change. Alternatively, from a qualitative social science perspective, one 
could examine how the ways in which people interpret experiences of change shape the 
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potential contained within transitions. In this paper, we adopt the latter approach, drawing on 
both psychosocial and anthropological perspectives to examine the identity-creating role of 
narrative and how people – construed as meaning-making subjects - make sense of transitions 
(Henwood, Pidgeon and Parkhill, 2015). 
 
Narratives provide us with important resources for sense making. Everyday life, public 
policy, and academic research are replete with instances where a narrative ordering of events 
is used to explain change. A traditional linear narrative structure, with a beginning, a middle 
that develops tensions implicit in the beginning, and a resolution of some kind, is often but 
not always encountered in such uses of narrative. In policy narratives, the resolution is often 
promised or projected, ahead of a beginning that is identified with the present and expected to 
succeed subsequent dramatic tensions created by projected actions. Such narratives help to 
coordinate and justify action in the present (Moezzi & Janda, 2014), but also to establish 
definitions of the identity of the protagonists of the story and what actions may be expected 
of them. These functions also operate in more everyday uses of narrative.  
Recent examples of policy narratives around sustainable transitions focus on the need to 
reduce energy consumption and identify behavior as an appropriate focus for change 
initiatives (Moezzi & Janda, 2014). Most often, these describe a present in which domestic 
consumers waste too much energy. Agents of change are thus identified as individual, 
reflexive, and rational consumers concerned with costs and benefits and thus able to alter 
how they consume energy – Strengers’ (2013) ‘resource men’ – along with technologists who 
can develop devices such as smart meters that can provide individuals with the information 
they need to alter how they use energy. In contesting the explanatory value of such behavior-
focused theories of change, practice theory has offered alternative narratives in which 
different protagonists (i.e. practices themselves together with policymakers) are identified as 
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agents of change. This approach brings with it a different politics of transitions, in which 
individuals are no longer summoned to bear primary responsibility (Shove et al. 2012: 163-
64).   
 
In both instances, however, narratives are offered that belong to a particular genre (Mulvey, 
1987), one of linear stories of progress – leading from a ‘lower state’ (wastefulness), thanks 
to the employment of technical expertise, to a ‘higher state’ in which difficulties are resolved 
or at least lessened. Even though practice theory, in some of its most recent iterations, 
stresses the unpredictability and non-linearity of how practices emerge, it still aims at 
creating interventions that are more technically-effective in achieving given policy goals than 
other approaches – by making practices rather than individual behavior the ‘target’ of 
intervention  (Shove et al. 2012: 18). This genre has been seen as characteristic of temporal 
orientations and modes of explanation widely encountered within ‘rationalized’ or ‘post-
traditional’ societies (Adam & Groves, 2007; Layne, 2000). However, the narrative forms 
individual subjects use to make sense of their own affectively-laden experiences of transition 
may conflict explicitly with such normative ‘master’ genres, even though these genres are 
widely internalised as generally representative of experience (Andrews, 2002). Some 
commentators have noted that sociology has often ignored the affective dimensions of 
individual experience in understanding how people make sense of and construct social reality 
(e.g. Wilkinson, 2001). An example of this neglect is how sociological theories of change fail 
to notice how conflicts and tensions arising from within individual experiences of transition 
might not be resolvable in the ways typically prescribed by linear narratives of 
transformation. As a result, individuals may find themselves unable to reconcile their 
experiences with dominant linear narratives. Consequently, they may come to occupy subject 
positions that are not those valorized within such narratives. These may be liminal positions, 
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i.e. ones that cannot be made sense of within dominant genres (Layne, 1996, 2000), or abject 
ones, whose distance from the categories of identity valorized within dominant narratives 
may evoke strongly negative emotions such as disgust and self-disgust (Squire, 1999). The 
prevalent affective tenor of such experiences may, as a result, be anxiety – understood as a 
response to feeling one’s identity to be threatened (Wilkinson, 2001: 22-5).  
 
Narrative analysis in sociology has drawn attention to how individuals, such as women 
dealing with unsuccessful courses of in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) (Throsby, 2002) or making 
decisions over post-mastectomy breast reconstruction (Sandell, 2008) may construct counter-
narratives in response to being positioned in this way by master genres, producing new 
identities as ways of dealing with anxiety through an emotional labour of meaning-making. 
Such responses are, however, conditional on the resources needed to create such counter-
narratives being available (e.g. forms of valued identity not based on parenthood, in the case 
of unsuccessful IVF), and such narratives may be fragile if individuals find themselves cut 
off from groups for whom such resources are present.  As Wilkinson (2001) and Smail (2005) 
have independently argued, the kinds of conflicts mentioned above and any accompanying 
anxiety are not purely individual phenomena, emotional ‘troubles’ which require a 
therapeutic response. Rather they bear an indexical relationship to social issues, such as 
inequalities in the capacities individuals possess, as members of groups, to make sense of and 
act upon their world. 
 
In this paper, we explore the importance of clashes between dominant narratives and 
individual experiences for understanding practices of energy consumption. In doing so, we 
use an approach to narrative that draws on the concept of liminality developed by Victor 
Turner (1974). We develop this approach through analysis of qualitative data from narrative 
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interviews conducted as part of the Energy Biographies project at Cardiff University. Our 
analysis of lifecourse transitions evoked within personal narratives concerning changes in 
energy use shows how experiences of transition may contain difficult-to-address dimensions 
of conflict relating to identity.  The presence of such dimensions demonstrates, we suggest, 
that experiences of transition may create barriers to sustainable transformations, rather than 
unproblematically offer opportunities for them.  
 
Sense-making, narrative and liminality 
The importance of narrative for making sense of change 
It is widely recognised that narrative forms have an important function in sense-making: 
enabling the exploration of readily-available but also less-available meanings (Henwood, 
Pidgeon, Parkhill, & Simmons, 2011) in the search for plausible and coherent interpretations 
of the meaning of phenomena. Stories position the living present within the context of a 
biographical and historical past, but also help us make sense of future possibilities 
(Macintyre, 1981: 215) and provide an emotional scaffold for practical and interpretative 
capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001). They allow individuals with distinct viewpoints to coordinate 
action (Brown, Stacey, & Nandhakumar, 2008), and help us understand our status in relation 
to others (Giddens, 1991). The cultural availability of particular narrative forms has been 
found to be particularly important to help people make sense of uncertainty, novelty or 
anomalous situations (Polletta, 1998).  
 
In recent times, these functions of cultural narrative forms or genres have been linked to the 
contemporary phenomena of reflexivity and ‘individualisation,’ which scholars have 
interpreted as processes of change through which subjects are discursively positioned as 
individually responsible (Burchell, 1993) both for planning their own futures, and for shaping 
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their own identities - often in contravention of what were hitherto established social 
expectations (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Institutional change within contemporary 
neoliberal societies is often seen as promoting such developments. Political rationalities or 
policy narratives, which seek to govern through risk management and place an emphasis on 
individual responsibility for risk, are also seen as having an influence (Rose, 1999). 
Theoretical positions on the centrality of individual reflexivity to identity in postmodern 
societies have therefore been interpreted as sharing central features with models of rational 
choice in economics and policy literature on behavior change (Adams, 2003: 222). Literature 
on individual experiences of risk across the lifecourse indicates, however, that narratives that 
tend to depict individual actors as rational, calculating managers of individual risk may clash 
with experiences that cannot be worked through within the frames provided by such 
narratives.  
 
In healthcare, for example, the limits of reflexivity and narratives of life planning have been 
traced in lay people’s representations of illness as a particular kind of lifecourse transition 
(Crawford, 2004).  Moving beyond the sociology of health, Layne (2000) discusses how 
narrative genres of progressive, reflexive change (such as personal growth, choosing to have 
a child or career success) are challenged by traumatic events like stillbirth or unemployment. 
Here, a genre of narratives that normalises and valorizes reflexive individual agency runs 
aground on transitions that it cannot easily render coherent for the individual (e.g. death, loss, 
contingent vulnerability). Faced with the threats posed to constituted identities by such 
transitions, ideals of individual autonomy may, in fact, encourage defensive emotional 
reactions, including (for example) the narrated disavowal of vulnerability (Layton, 2014).  
Dealing with such clashes between culturally-dominant narrative forms and problematic 
experiences of contingency is, however, a key part of what anthropologists have identified as 
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the social function of a specific genre of narratives, which provide shared resources for 
negotiating and making sense of ‘liminal’ transitions in which individual identities – but also 
the symbolic order itself – face disruption. 
 
Liminal transitions as narratives of change 
‘Rites of passage’ are connected to transitions that are undergone by individuals but that are 
also seen as typical of the human condition by a given culture. Particularly in traditional 
societies, they embody a genre in the sense that they narrate the passage of the individual, at 
particular points of the lifecourse, through an ambiguous condition outside settled social 
categories that ends with him/her returning into society within a different category to the one 
s/he originally occupied. 
 
If identity and agency are shaped by narratives, then narrative forms or genres may be seen as 
a condition of the ‘ontological security’ (Giddens, 1991) of individuals. This condition is 
dependent upon more or less stable core expectations regarding one’s environment, and 
therefore upon the practices one engages in and the emotional attachments one has to people 
and things within it (Marris, 1996). The purpose of rites of passage narratives is to manage 
disruptions to practices, attachments and expectations (and thereby to identity and agency) 
that are associated with lifecourse transitions. The idea that such transitions are liminal in 
nature, as articulated by van Gennep (1960) and later by Turner (1974), identifies them as 
times when individuals move outside the symbolic space within which a culture orders its 
world. As such, these transitions are, Turner insists, potential disruptions to the social order 
as well as to the individual’s sense of self.1  
 
                                                          
1
 Jackson (1989) stresses that the idea of a self in crisis need not mean an individual self in the sense defined 
within post-traditional societies. 
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Negotiating these difficult periods depends on the availability of narrative forms that allow 
both the breaking of attachments and migration between identity-defining practices to be 
made emotionally and symbolically meaningful, particularly by orchestrating experiences of 
re-attachment and initiation into new practices. Examples of such ‘liminal transitions’ in pre-
traditional societies include childbirth, marriage, transition from childhood to adulthood, and 
death and/or mourning. In each case narrative forms tend to structure change in three phases 
that mirror those set out in classic theories of narrative (Mulvey, 1987): pre-transitional, 
liminal, and post-liminal/re-integrative. Demarcations between these phases are created by 
specific performative rituals. Following their symbolic or physical sequestration outside the 
social order, individuals in a liminal state undergo a progressive re-integration into society by 
e.g. re-naming, moving the place of habitation within a village, or re-identifying a dead 
individual as an impersonal ‘ancestor’ (Jackson, 1989). At the same time a new form of 
agency is assigned to them (as mother, hunter, ancestor etc.), a role to which specific 
practices and expectations are attached. Finally, the breaking of old attachments for living 
subjects is succeeded by re-attachment (e.g. moving from mother-son to comradely 
relationships among hunters). Successful transition therefore re-builds identity and agency.   
 
Post-traditional societies also exhibit certain liminal forms of transition (childbirth, marriage, 
death etc.). Nonetheless, the reflexivity that characterises post-traditional societies may mean 
liminal transitions become less ‘standardized’ (Draper, 2003). At the same time, new liminal 
transitions are also created, establishing new narrative episodes and rituals that may become 
distinctive sub-genres (leaving school and entering the workplace, retirement).  
 
Turner also identifies another genre of liminal transition, in which narratives and rituals 
become more explicitly reflexive towards traditional social categories and norms, concerned 
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with creating new forms of individual and collective identity, rather than just re-integrating 
individuals into already-established expectations, identities and forms of agency. Examples of 
such ‘liminoid’ transitions (Turner, 1974) typically arise from willed change, and might 
therefore include the efforts of individuals to reflexively manage their own ‘life project’ 
(moving house, taking up a new job and so on) but also more collective, socially 
experimental activities (drug-taking, protest). These may involve the creation of experimental 
spaces (music festivals, communes, occupations) in which practices and identities are to a 
greater or lesser extent ‘up for grabs’, with no pre-given, normative structures to move back 
into. Some forms of liminoid transition are, however, succeeded by re-integration and the re-
formation of identity through a return to ‘normal’ life, through processes of breaking and re-
forming attachments (e.g. moving house).  
  
In post-traditional societies, both genres of transition narrative become reordered by 
expectations of reflexivity. Yet at the same time, reflexive construction of life-paths and 
identities in line with narratives of progress or growth may encounter obstacles, as the studies 
by Layne, Sandell and Throsby cited previously indicate. Their work suggests that, in an 
increasingly generalised condition of reflexivity, negotiating lifecourse transitions is 
increasingly framed as a matter of progressive, willed change, in which individuals as shapers 
of their own identities are the primary actors. But to negotiate liminal transitions, in Turner’s 
strict sense of ‘liminal’, like adolescence, marriage, childbirth and death, is to encounter and 
deal with challenges to identity that are culturally acknowledged to be part of a shared 
‘human condition’ born of uncertainty and contingency. Anthropologists have mapped how 
shared cultural resources enable people to acknowledge negativity, vulnerability, and 
incapacity within a shared interpretation of a human condition through liminal transitions. 
Such resources make it possible for subjects to deal with the anxieties that surround 
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transitional disruptions of identity, so that these disruptions become less intractable. They 
provide subjects with ways of being re-integrated into identities in which disruptions can be 
incorporated as meaningful episodes.  
 
Post-traditional societies may therefore be characterised by tensions and even conflicts 
between the two genres of narrative introduced by Turner. Liminoid transitions tend to be 
individualised and privatised, and represent re-integration in progressive terms that reflect 
this individualisation (e.g. ‘finding oneself’). While liminal transitions could be viewed as 
progressive too (e.g. adolescents are initiated into adulthood and leave behind childhood), the 
step forward here is within some broader social cycle of integration (the human lifecourse in 
general). The more open nature of liminoid transitions places on those who undertake them a 
greater burden, that of defining the terms of successful re-integration in order to deal with 
negative experiences when they occur.   
 
An implication is that lifecourse transitions, whether liminal or liminoid in nature, have a 
more complex and ambiguous significance than is admitted by attempts to identify them as 
‘opportunities’ for transforming practices. As Layne, Throsby and Sandell point out, such a 
reading may be at odds with the actual experiences of those who undergo them. In the 
analysis that follows, we explore examples of liminal and liminoid lifecourse transitions 
taken from Energy Biographies interview data. Our analysis sheds light on how tensions 
associated with such lifecourse transitions may emerge and manifest themselves in the 
personal narratives people use to make sense of their experiences. In particular, we consider 
narratives about changes in how people use energy. These are, on the one hand, stories about 
how individuals see lifecourse transitions as significant in shaping how they use energy, 
against a backdrop of increasingly culturally-dominant progress narratives about demand 
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reduction, cost-saving, and environmental responsibility. On the other, they are stories about 
difficulties individuals face in being reflexive towards the ways in which they use energy, 
and how these difficulties are related to disruptions to identity associated with lifecourse 
transitions.  
 
Methods 
The Energy Biographies project at Cardiff University has employed narrative and multimodal 
methods to examine biographical transitions through the lens of our reliance and dependence 
on energy infrastructure and consumption. Unlike more structured qualitative approaches, 
narrative methods enable interviewees to explore the affective and emotional content of 
biographical transitions, their experiential relevance, and how they are situated in specific 
times and places (Henwood et al, 2010). In particular, they allow the ‘before,’ ‘during,’ and 
‘after’ of specific transitions, together with the connections between past transitions, present 
events and future possibilities to be explored (Henwood & Shirani, 2012). 
 
Across four diverse case site areas in the UK, interviews were conducted with individuals on 
three occasions over a one-year period. In total, 74 people participated in first round 
interviews and a sub-sample of 36 took part in two subsequent rounds of interviews and 
multimodal activities.  Participants lived in very different contexts across the UK, ranging 
from more rural locations (e.g. West Wales) to urban ones (e.g. London), and the sample 
contained people with a wide range of different social characteristics. Participants were asked 
to complete two photo tasks using a camera phone between subsequent rounds of interviews 
In the analysis we use interviews from three of our case sites to explore some of the structural 
characteristics of transitions narrated by interviewees. We then relate these to concepts of 
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liminality explored in the foregoing sections to examine in more detail the role of narrative 
and identity in sense-making.  
 
Exploring personal narratives of transition 
‘We know it’s bad but we’re still going to use it’ 
When Lucy was first interviewed she had recently moved from London with her partner and 
young children to a house in Peterson-super-Ely, an affluent commuter village in South 
Wales near Cardiff, a region in which Lucy and her husband both had family roots (see also 
Groves et al, forthcoming). She presented this transition as motivated by a desire for an 
enhanced ‘quality of life’ that was felt impossible in London (though it was also evidently 
motivated by a desire to return nearer to the children’s grandparents). To achieve this 
progress meant establishing a (re)new(ed) identity around the values she saw as embodied in 
her new home and in its rural surroundings, values that were at once aesthetic and ethical – 
‘ethical’ in the sense of helping to identify a way of life that is not merely ‘preferred’ but 
implicitly represented as valuable and meaningful for people more universally (O'Neill, 
1993).  
 
These values expressed an aesthetic of homeliness and also the importance of hosting old 
friends from London and elsewhere to maintain significant relationships. Lucy’s narrative of 
transition exposes, however, a tension between these aesthetic and ethical values and another, 
longer-established element of her identity.  She had long prided herself on being able to 
manage energy use efficiently, and sees this efficiency (defined chiefly in terms of lowering 
costs of essential energy use) as a central organising value for the household, one that she 
suggests her husband sometimes subverts. At the same time, this value is primarily prudential 
rather than moral in nature:  
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I don’t think I really feel guilty I just think I’m aware and it does make me cross when 
like Sean especially just is deliberately almost you know wasting it […] 
  
Having moved into a larger, more expensive to heat house (especially during regular visits 
from friends and their families), she felt it was vital to reduce energy consumption: ‘I never 
really wanted to waste money, energy but now I think it’s just, when I got my last energy bill, 
I couldn't believe it.’ 
 
Nonetheless, she represented certain kinds of excess and waste as implicitly necessary to 
realise the aesthetic and ethical values she associates with a higher quality of life. For 
example, during the project’s participant-led photo task, Lucy photographed her household’s 
patio heaters, the ‘wastefulness’ of which she highlighted. Importantly, though, her seeing 
‘heating the outdoors’ (Hitchings, 2007) as a source of waste was downplayed because a new 
threshold of comfort and enjoyment of life in the family’s rural setting had become important 
to her. 
 
… we do love our patio heater when it’s a sunny evening but it gets a bit cold and dark 
and you can sit out and they’re like probably the worst things aren’t they?  But we love it 
well we only use it about five times a year so it’s OK. 
 
She agreed with what had, in the UK, become a widely-shared view of the patio heater as a 
symbol of waste (Eccleston, 2007). But the meaning of the device and the practices 
associated with it lay for her but in how ‘heating the outdoors’ contributed to her identity, in 
15 
 
her new home, as a generous friend and hostess, extending the ‘warmth’ of the interior 
outside, making her home but also its rural surroundings more welcoming for friends: 
 
Cos we love being outside, we just love that you can you know go, we were sitting out 
there one evening … it was like midnight and you could have a drink outside still and 
it’s so lovely here cos it’s so quiet and everything so but you wouldn’t have been able 
to do it without that […].  So that’s our kind of, we know it’s really bad but we’re still 
going to use it (emphasis added). 
 
She also photographed the wood the family burns on open fires, which had been reinstated in 
the renovated house because of their aesthetic association with ‘homeliness’:  
 
[…] we have a log fire and we are getting a log fire and how actually they’re probably 
super inefficient aren’t they in heating a room? […] we’ve put massive radiators in our 
new house cos its really Victorian, tall ceilings, and so we just don’t need a wood 
burner to be on at any point but actually it’ll sort of make the room  […]. 
 
The contribution of the fireplaces to household ambience had decisively shaped choices about 
heating and energy use in the face of pragmatic considerations. Together with the patio 
heaters, the open fireplaces embodied for Lucy a kind of congruence between (relocated) 
house and self (Giuliani, 1991), between a warm, welcoming home and the friend and hostess 
eager to re-affirm old relationships on the far side of a liminoid lifecourse transition.  
 
The story Lucy tells is one in which ‘higher’ values are being realised through the planned 
remodelling of family life, a voluntary, liminoid transition that begins with leaving the city 
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and ends with a higher quality of life in the countryside. At the same time, this re-integrative 
phase appears unresolved, containing tensions created by the position of energy use practices 
in her narrative. The partially re-built individual identity she describes is one that focuses on 
the aesthetic and ethical values of homeliness and friendship (as opposed to, say, her 
perspective on her role within the family). But these values then come into conflict with 
certain of her more pragmatic and long-standing values. Higher energy use, Lucy insists, does 
not make her feel something like either guilt or shame.  
 
On the one hand, she actively denies the presence of any moral conflict between her values of 
wise management and those of homeliness and ‘quality of life,’ despite the increasing cost of 
heating the house. On the other, she insists (while talking about her wood fires) that the 
household’s level of consumption is effectively normative for the community: ‘it’s fairly 
typical, everyone’s got a couple of cars, everyone’s you know got wood burning stoves’.  
 
Her attempts to resolve tensions within the story lead her back to emphasize her actively 
chosen vision of a ‘good life,’ the identity associated with it, and the practices of hospitality 
central to it. These have led the family to adopt practices that she finds hard to integrate with 
her sense of being a ‘wise manager’. She acknowledges the existence of tensions between 
these identities in her final statement about the patio heater ‘we know it’s bad, but we’re still 
gonna use it’. Here, she adds to her story of change a defensive disavowal that cuts through 
the Gordian knot of tensions at a stroke, providing a narrative resolution of a moral conflict 
that nonetheless preserves the tensions between practices and identities within it.  
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‘I’ve decided it’s best to be confused’ 
Graham, his partner Laura and school-age children moved in 2009 to the Lammas/Tir-y-
Gafel ecovillage in Pembrokeshire. Ecovillage residents are living off-grid, have built their 
own homes, and have land-based livelihoods. The site is unique as the first of its kind in the 
UK to receive planning permission, on condition that residents meet 75% of their basic needs 
from the land within 5 years. The transition to living at Lammas is, like that undergone by 
Lucy’s family, voluntary in nature and driven by the conscious assertion of particular values. 
The transition is also somewhat open-ended, with residents seeing the end (completion and 
purpose) of the transition period as achieving a stable way of life that is more sustainable than 
the ‘mainstream’. The end of this period was expected to arrive with the achievement of 
particular milestones, such as the setting up of community hydropower. At the same time, a 
clearer endpoint is provided by the terms of planning permission (which set out the 75% 
demand). 
 
Graham tells the story of his family’s move from a city home to Lammas as a values-driven 
decision, based on long-shared visions of the future. 
 
I think we always intended to live in a country-sidey place, back in a cottage on top of a 
hill, except with loads of kids kind of thing. So we had this plan to do something and 
that the [city] 'thing' wasn't 'it’.  
 
This vision was, he suggests, definitive for his wife and himself of what a better, and more 
sustainable life, would look like. Yet the move, Graham felt, was one in which his agency 
was limited (‘I was just dragged along in the slipstream really. So Laura pioneered the move 
and I sort of followed’). In addition, he suggests that due to a long-established sense of being 
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an ‘outsider’, rooted in the ‘oddness’ of his childhood family (which followed a different 
religion to others in the local area, and was materially poor), he felt before the move a certain 
scepticism and distance to Lammas as a form of collective living. This scepticism, he 
reported, lasted through the transition itself. 
 
As part of the drive to earn 75% of household income from the land, Graham started a 
business supplying food to restaurants. This experience, he reported, had allowed him to re-
discover a sense of agency and associated feelings of guilt about the family’s dependence on 
tax credits in the absence of income from employment: ‘it feels a bit wrong to be getting 
more tax credits than you're earning really.’ 
 
Nonetheless, he also acknowledged other moral difficulties. Graham’s commitment to 
sustainability was troubled by his feelings about how he had managed to express this 
commitment, but also about how he was taking care of other commitments. He expresses 
misgivings, for example, about whether moving to Lammas was the best thing for his 
children. He was unsure whether how the family is living is genuinely sustainable, and more 
radically, what would count as evidence for answering this question one way or the other. He 
represented his ideal of sustainable living as somewhat brittle, wedded to pursuit of 
consistency in thought and deed, and reported finding himself policing the deviations of his 
own household and of others from what practices that he took to symbolize low impact 
living. He found these deviations to be a source of guilt but also, more strongly, of outward-
looking shame:  
 
Anything I feel embarrassed about is probably a good marker. So I'm embarrassed 
about the polytunnel, I'm embarrassed about the car, I'm embarrassed about any black 
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sheets of plastic around and I'm embarrassed by the pond liner. I'm embarrassed about 
the insulation. Any sheets of plastic or plastic tubes we use in the house I'm 
embarrassed by. […]  
 
He also found himself policing his own ‘judgemental’ attitudes. Ultimately, he says, the 
impossibility of not deviating from images of what Lammas should be have led him to adopt 
a different perspective on his guilt and shame. 
 
I've decided it's best to be confused. I always think there's the 'confused' and then 
there's the 'deluded' who are confused but they think they're not! So they are confused, I 
acknowledge the confusion and I don't know what I'm doing. But I do carry a lot of 
guilt you know but at the same time I think, 'I'll just get on with it', just try your best. 
 
This new ‘identity’ seems to have been adopted precisely to deal with the moral difficulties 
and resultant feelings Graham associates with identifying too much with the goals and ideals 
he takes to be central to Lammas. It is a dynamic condition that he identifies not with an end-
state, but with the achievement of ‘balance’: 
 
It’s not so much trajectory that starts off low and it aims higher. It’s not supposed to be 
on a trajectory of everlasting progress like we are supposed to be living on the land and 
it just cycles along, and it is the same every year really. 
 
To achieve this balance requires the sharing of practical expertise learnt by members of the 
community through varied past experiences of permaculture, self-building and so on. As 
such, practices adopted within the community represent imperfect ‘traditions’ formed in a 
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variety of places and communities which are applied, situated and adapted in the context of 
Lammas, and which provide for Graham a counterweight to his individualised concerns.  
 
Graham’s narrative is, like Lucy’s, an example of a voluntary, liminoid transition, guided by 
actively chosen values. Here, however, the Lammas community is collectively suspended, to 
an extent, within a condition of liminality that is shared unevenly across the group. The stage 
of ‘official’ re-integration (represented by final assessment of the 75% target) remained in the 
future during the interviews, but other milestones (such as setting up the community’s own 
micro-hydropower) were passed during this period. More generally, though, questions of 
collective and individual identity during the transition remain unsettled. Building attachment 
relationships through mutual assistance and group rituals of celebration (birthdays, solstice 
and ‘beating the bounds’ festivals) are represented by Graham and others as important for 
building identity, in addition to the sharing of knowledge about practices for low-impact 
living originating with other communities of self-builders. There remain, however, no fixed 
‘recipes’ for transitioning to a low-impact individual, family or collective identity. 
 
Amidst this ongoing uncertainty and its attendant effects, Graham finds within his experience 
what he represents as elements of an emerging identity.  He describes the emergence of this 
liminal identity through an ironic narrative that remains unresolved, in which he sees himself 
as striving to live up to an ideal through practices that he cannot be sure are those appropriate 
to the desired, re-integrated identity of a resident of a low-impact community. He finds 
himself constantly asking whether he is ‘doing the right thing,’ but then also acknowledges 
that there is, ultimately, no way of knowing. Graham narrates the transition as a progressive 
odyssey whose future outcome remains uncertain, but which can be imagined as linked to 
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cyclical rhythms of inevitably imperfect practices. Participation in these practices establishes 
participation in a collective condition that, while still liminal and ongoing, is valued. 
 
“I really don’t know what the future is going to bring” 
Christine is in her early fifties, and lives with her husband and youngest child (her other 
children having now left home) in a large house on the outskirts of Ely in Cardiff.  The 
family moved to the house several years earlier, due to the need to find a larger property to 
accommodate one of their children’s disabilities. They had recently put their house up for 
sale, given that most of their children had left, but were hoping to remain within the area as 
they has a strong attachment to it and the community. Before the first interview, Christine 
had recently become unemployed. During the course of the interviews, the death of her 
father-in-law, who had recently come to live with the family, occurred. 
 
The multiple lifecourse transitions Christine described in her interviews had brought a variety 
of changes in how the family consumed energy. She had moved house several times as family 
circumstances have changed, e.g. splitting up with a former partner and then re-marrying, and 
most recently, moving in her father-in-law. This latter transition, for example, meant keeping 
the house warmer, at a more constant temperature. Nonetheless, she represented all these 
transitions as temporary disruptions. Her narrative centred, overall, on representations of 
herself as flexible, adaptive and capable. At the same time, she mentioned at several points 
throughout the interviews a sense of not being able to ‘look into the future’.  
 
Participation in particular home renovation practices appeared as a constant theme in her 
personal narrative, anchoring her descriptions of herself and her ability to care for her family. 
In her first marriage, she purchased ‘a run-down property that myself and my first husband 
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renovated’. With her current partner, she has undertaken a series of house moves occasioned 
by family requirements: ‘[…] the idea was to convert the double garage into a unit 
specifically for [disabled son], so it was self-contained and that's what we did […]’). Her 
identity as adaptable and capable extends beyond this, however, as she affirms while 
recalling her life with her previous partner in the 1980s: 
 
I had the two eldest children and a low income. You just got by. It sounds really strange 
and it does sound very nostalgic saying, 'Well you just got by.'  If you've got a choice 
and only X amount of money coming in and the choice is eat or to put petrol in your car 
or not so much petrol in your car but to run a car and there's public transport – and there 
was, at that time, it was a lot less expensive – then you just look for alternative things. 
 
Despite multiple transitions, then, the impression she gave was of continuity of identity, of 
repeatedly re-integrating back into the position of mother but also re-builder. In contrast to 
Lucy’s narrative of ‘upward’ progress, Christine narrated the series of transitions she has 
experienced as re-integrating her into new cycles of care: renovating houses after moving, 
saying goodbye to children who had left home, and welcoming them back after university 
terms or relationship break-ups, taking in aged parents, gaining and losing employment.  
 
Some are subtle changes that you don't realise until you think about 'oh okay!' our way 
of living is always like this. Like I said, right at the very beginning, kids leave, kids 
come back whether it's University or whether they move in with their friends or 
whether they move in with a partner, whether that relationship suffers and they come 
back, they always come back to mum.  
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Managing energy consumption was described a vital part of balancing the needs of family 
members in negotiating transitions. Reworking, recycling, re-using was also part of balancing 
needs, ranging from clothes (‘I’ve always got charity bags in my cupboard’) to heating 
systems (‘that’s my gas fire that I’ve got rid of’) and home extensions. She represented 
settling into patterned family life on the other side of a transition as a kind of achieved, 
dynamic balance within the family and between the household and the social environment it 
is dependent on.  
 
This pattern, in which transitions are resolved by returning to old cycles of care or beginning 
new ones, formed an underlying narrative structure for Christine’s story, somewhat like a 
spiral. Her identification of herself as carer and builder, and her stories of her activities of 
caring and building/re-building, position her as subject to the vicissitudes of an embodied, 
relational and vulnerable existence, but also as actively and resiliently responding to 
uncertainty with partners and family. However, while this narrative form undoubtedly 
supports her sense of herself as adaptable and flexible in the face of what are seen as more 
universal troubles (‘you just got by’), it may also sometimes be disruptive and problematic: 
‘Oh God, I literally, you just don't know what's around the corner […] so we don't look into 
the future as such.’ 
 
Participating in practices that support cycles of care may also make it harder to plan for the 
future, and even to think about it (Shirani et al. 2015). In addition, and against the 
background of these observations about the difficulty of planning for the future, the practices 
through which these cycles are re-established can even be de-stabilising. After the death of 
her father-in-law, Christine and her husband had begun to redecorate the house again, 
perhaps hastily: ‘the first thing that I think of is just changing your environment.’ This 
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decision was linked to several others relating to a plan to sell the house that turned out to 
have a temporary destabilising effect on the household. This episode led Christine to state 
‘never make a decision when you’ve just had bereavement.’ 
 
Christine thus narrates a series of liminoid transitions linked to family needs (such as moving 
house) but also liminal ones (in Turner’s strict sense, such as unemployment, divorce, 
bereavement). Within this personal narrative about using practical capabilities to balance 
needs, saving money and being less wasteful with energy are constant concerns. She was 
aware of a range of energy saving measures, but at the same time, stories of how energy use 
has changed during and after the transitions she describes are tangled up with longer-term 
family narratives (children growing up, leaving home for university and new relationships) 
that include stories of decline or loss (unemployment, children splitting up with partners, the 
death of her father-in-law). Although her participation in a range of practices is essential to 
how she has managed change, these practices are focused on ‘keeping afloat’, reflecting 
financial circumstances but also a variety of contingent events. Adaptability here may also 
mean adapting one’s perspective, focusing reflexively on a relatively narrow sphere of 
concerns, which may make it difficult to plan for thoroughgoing and durable changes in how 
energy is used, or indeed, in other areas of life: ‘you just don't know what's around the 
corner’. Adopting an active stance of silence about the future – refusing to speak about it –
displaces tensions originating from a persistent conflict between an attraction to reflexivity 
and the demands of ‘keeping afloat’. 
 
Discussion: Problematizing the ‘Opportunity’ of Transitions 
Each case study in the foregoing section features different examples of personal narratives 
concerning lifecourse transitions which suggest that experiences of transitions tend to be 
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much more complex and multifaceted than policy narratives which talk of transitions as 
‘opportunities’ would suggest. In each case, tensions emerge out of an individual’s attempts 
to achieve re-integration into meaningful identities in the wake of transitions. These tensions 
indicate how narrative forms which centre on tropes of progress may, as in the examples from 
Layne, Throsby and Sandell discussed earlier, run aground on experiences which evoke 
anxiety around threats to identity.  
 
Our analysis here therefore suggests, in line with a long tradition of work on narrative and 
identity, particularly within the sociology of health and medicine, that to understand the 
significance of reflexivity in social life we must also investigate the persistence of 
contingency, negativity and their affective complements and how they affect identity-making. 
For example, Frank (1955) argues that the significance of contingent and abject elements of 
illness experiences tends to be downplayed by dominant, progressive medical narratives with 
which clinicians frame treatment decisions. This makes it difficult for patients to deal with 
uncomfortable episodes of their illness and treatment. Further, in addition to the work of 
Layne, Throsby and Sandell on gender and health narratives already cited, other work on 
gender has explored the extent to which reflexivity towards traditional gender roles and 
family structures can deal with episodes of negativity or vulnerability (e.g. May 2004). While 
underlining the importance of themes present within these traditions of scholarship, our 
analysis also explores the conditions under which it is possible to become reflexive about 
(individualised) reflexivity, and which may be provided by shared experiences and cultural 
resources. Graham’s narrative of a liminoid transition, for example, suggests that difficulties 
and threats to identity may be acknowledged and addressed in ways that enable reflexivity 
towards accepted practices and also to one’s own feelings of responsibility to be sustained. 
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Adams (2003) argues that, within post-traditional societies, reflexivity itself, and its emphasis 
on individualised, progressive transformation, represents a determinate set of shared cultural 
expectations about how individuals should manage change in their lives. Liminoid transitions 
are thus increasingly normalised as ways of dealing with contingency.  Yet Turner’s analysis 
reminds us that reflexivity towards the particular cultural resources one inherits is a stance 
that cannot escape having to deal with a more universal challenge to the symbolic order, that 
of a human condition characterised both by mortality, and by uncertainty about a contingent 
future. As Layne and others have suggested, a clash between expectations of reflexivity and 
individual experiences of contingency may challenge assumptions about identity in ways that 
may bring troubling affects.  
 
In previous analytical work on Energy Biographies (Groves et al, forthcoming), we have 
suggested, in line with Layne’s work, that a psychosocial perspective on transition may be 
necessary to understand the tensions, feelings of insecurity and discomfort, and possibly 
deeper anxieties that may result from clashes between dominant expectations of reflexivity 
and individual experiences of insecurity or vulnerability. These tensions, feelings and affects, 
and any resultant anxieties about identity, may then be displaced from full acknowledgement 
within narratives by strategies such as active disavowal (as with Lucy’s) or active silence (as 
in Christine’s). Tensions within Lucy’s narrative arise from conflicts between different 
values, which relate to perhaps incompatible desired identities. These tensions are then 
disavowed, in two ways:  by projecting a normative ‘wastefulness’ into the community and 
its higher quality of life, and by explicitly disavowing negative emotions. By ‘heating the 
outdoors’ Lucy ranks a practice of luxury consumption that she judges to be ‘really bad’ 
above either pragmatic concerns with efficiency or shared moral norms. Her 
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acknowledgement of this is then immediately followed by a stated disavowal of guilt or 
shame. 
 
For Christine, the future considered as an object of reflexive planning is transformed into an 
object that induces anxiety. She positions herself through her narrative as having steadily 
built, with successive partners, an identity constructed to some extent around reflexivity, 
supported by expectations, practices and routines of care for family and home. At the same 
time, the creativity she has exercised is focused on the near term and on improvising 
responses to contingent events. Her ingenuity and practical skill are a source of emotional as 
well as material security, but also point towards a background of insecurity and to the future 
as a topic on which she is largely silent: ‘we don't look into the future as such’. Her 
awareness of this background insecurity is connected to the realities of cyclical care as well 
as to financial concerns.  
 
Graham’s narrative differs because it is concerned with a transition that is still underway, one 
in which the individual and group identity of ‘low impact living’ is in the process of being 
created. Whereas Lucy’s narrative of transition disavows (yet thereby also preserves) 
tensions, Graham’s explicitly sets out tensions between values and practices in an ironic 
mode, which distances him from having to pronounce finally on what ‘low impact living’ is 
to mean: it’s pragmatically but also morally better to ‘be confused.’ At the same time, the 
reflexivity he sees embodied in the community promises a future of re-integration that can at 
least be imagined. Whereas Christine’s transitions between cycles of care that re-integrate her 
adaptive and competent agency cloak the future with silence, Graham represents the future as 
the hoped-for attainment of a kind of dynamic balance, ‘just cycling along.’ In this way, he is 
able, by reflecting on his expectations of community life and upon the meaning of sustainable 
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living as such, to live with uncertainty and anxiety, to find meaning in the tensions he 
experiences within the present. In liminal transitions, individual experiences are seen as 
examples of narrative genres that are universal within a culture. Although the Lammas 
transition is liminoid, the extent of the revisions of practice that are underway and the 
collective participation in these revisions introduces something of this universality, perhaps 
making uncertainty easier to handle.  
 
While Graham maintains a kind of ironic distance to the community, he finds examples 
among the other residents of ways of dealing with normative uncertainties that encourage him 
to acknowledge his own confusion while also coming to trust his own competences, and 
create a living link between his family’s past and the community’s future. The suggestion 
here is that shared narrative forms that incorporate difficulties and tensions may make 
negativity, anxiety about identity and uncertainty more liveable.  
 
Lucy and Christine’s narratives contain examples of reflexivity that run up against negativity 
in forms which are, by contrast, harder for them to address. In Lucy’s case, a progressive 
narrative of choice creates conflicts between different values around which identities are 
built. In Christine’s case, a narrative of adaptability has as its obverse a story about the 
difficulty of planning in conditions where great individual responsibility is assumed, though 
accompanied by financial constraints. Where tensions are in Lucy’s case disavowed and in 
Christine’s case pushed aside as too difficult, Graham addresses directly the normative 
uncertainties that surround the ‘reflexivity’ embodied in Lammas. It becomes possible to talk 
about his anxieties, to narrate his ongoing state of liminality, of confusion. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we have questioned progressive policy narratives that suggest that lifecourse 
transitions represent ‘opportunities’ for targeted behavior change initiatives. Having 
considered some existing empirical and critical social theory literature on reflexivity, our data 
has led us to consider some implications of Turner’s distinction between liminal and liminoid 
transitions for the assumption that disruption offers an opening for more change. Reflexivity 
itself represents a genre of narrative for understanding social change, which rests on a set of 
particular expectations about individual agency. As is shown in our data by the experiences 
of transition inscribed within Christine and Lucy’s narratives, these expectations may be 
undermined by contingencies that challenge expectations of individual reflexivity. In 
responding to such challenges, as we have seen, individuals may adopt defensive narrative 
strategies of various kinds that then obstruct further reflexivity towards existing practices – as 
exemplified by Lucy’s disavowal and Christine’s active silence. Here, reflexively questioning 
how a family uses energy comes to a halt. Yet as Wilkinson (2001) suggests, the link between 
reflexivity and emotions like anxiety is not straightforward. Reflexivity may generate anxiety 
at the possibility of disruption to identity – or as Graham’s narrative shows, may prompt 
shame, or embarrassment at elements of who one is. But rather than anxiety always 
preventing reflexivity, in the right circumstances, it may be possible to live with it, and go on 
questioning – even questioning (individualised) reflexivity itself.  
 
Layne (2000) suggests that progress, understood as a narrative genre that positions 
protagonists as largely autonomous individuals, creates difficulties for individuals when they 
are forced to try and make sense of experiences that undermine the expectations such 
narrative forms create. Both Lucy and Christine describe transitions that exhibit reflexivity of 
different kinds but also run into difficulties that are rooted in the identities created through 
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them and the threats to these identities posed by the experience of transition. Graham’s 
narrative implicitly positions Lammas as providing a different space, one in which such 
difficulties and their associated anxieties may be addressed. Here, a more collective setting of 
extensive reflexive practice change eases the emphasis on responsibility and individual 
choice that individualistic framings of change produce, making negativity and conflict more 
bearable and enabling the creation of narrative forms which make such difficulties more 
discussable (which is not to say that such communities, including Lammas, are without intra-
community conflict of various kinds).  
 
What Layne (2000) calls a ‘cultural fix,’ i.e. ways of creating resources and arenas for 
meaning-making that render discussable hidden conflicts and the vulnerabilities in which 
they are rooted may offer ways of addressing the kinds of psychosocial conflicts we have 
found manifested in narratives about individualised, reflexive change. She writes that cultural 
fixes such as ‘creating new narrative genres and story lines, changing the dominant model of 
personhood, and creating and gaining legitimacy for new rituals’ may seem impractical from 
a policy point of view (2000: 510), but that examples of support and advocacy groups 
working around pregnancy loss, premature birth, and unemployment in the USA suggest that 
such resources to support the affective and emotional labor of meaning-making are, in fact, 
essential. Such groups may be thought of as opening up the possibility of a similar collective 
experience of reflexivity to that which, Graham’s narrative seems to suggest, is offered by 
Lammas. Around energy, and the challenge changes in energy use present both to 
individualised narratives of responsibility and collective narratives of progress, similar spaces 
for ‘difficult conversions’ are being developed by initiatives such as Carbon Conversations 
(http://carbonconversations.org/) in the UK. Such efforts are explicit attempts to hold open 
the possibility of social transitions towards sustainability, by addressing the unspoken 
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troubles that obstruct and undermine the fit between narratives of change and the ways in 
which individuals make sense of their own lifecourse transitions.  
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